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 Abstract 
 
We study the assimilation behavior of a group of migrants who live in a city populated by 
native inhabitants. We conceptualize the group as a community, and the city as a social space. 
Assimilation increases the productivity of migrants and, consequently, their earnings. 
However, assimilation also brings the migrants closer in social space to the richer native 
inhabitants. This proximity subjects the migrants to relative deprivation. We consider a 
community of migrants whose members are at an equilibrium level of assimilation that was 
chosen as a result of the maximization of a utility function that has as its arguments income, 
the cost of assimilation effort, and a measure of relative deprivation. We ask how vulnerable 
this assimilation equilibrium is to the appearance of a “mutant” - a member of the community 
who is exogenously endowed with a superior capacity to assimilate. If the mutant were to act 
on his enhanced ability, his earnings would be higher than those of his fellow migrants, which 
will expose them to greater relative deprivation. We find that the stability of the pre-mutation 
assimilation equilibrium depends on the cohesion of the migrants’ community, expressed as 
an ability to effectively sanction and discourage the mutant from deviating. The equilibrium 
level of assimilation of a tightly knit community is stable in the sense of not being vulnerable 
to the appearance of a member becoming better able to assimilate. However, if the community 
is loose-knit, the appearance of a mutant will destabilize the pre-mutation assimilation 
equilibrium, and will result in a higher equilibrium level of assimilation. 
 
Keywords:  Community cohesion; Social proximity; Interpersonal comparisons; Relative 
deprivation; Migrants’ assimilation behavior 
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1. Introduction 
Urban areas are spatial structures, and to a large extent study of them has been that of 
geographical space. In this paper we conceptualize urban spaces as social spaces. In a city 
inhabited by natives and migrants, we inquire how considerations of social proximity of the 
migrants to the native inhabitants impact on the degree to which migrants’ assimilate. There 
has been considerable interest in how the presence of migrants affects the earnings of the 
native inhabitants (for example, whether migrants with a particular skill level enhance or 
depress the income of the native inhabitants),1 but little research has been done on how the 
(relatively high) incomes of a city’s native inhabitants affect the incomes of the migrants, with 
migrants’ assimilation being the intervening variable. 
A question that is at the heart of economic research on the assimilation of migrants is 
this: if integration and assimilation increase the productivity of migrants and, consequently, 
their earnings, why is it that migrants are quite often reluctant to assimilate, or if they do 
assimilate, why do they do so only partially? Specifically, why do migrants choose to exert a 
particular level of effort to assimilate, and what governs their choice of this or that level of 
effort?2 
In an earlier look at this subject, Fan and Stark (2007) considered the issue of limited 
assimilation from the perspective of the assimilation decision of a single migrant in a 
homogeneous community of migrants. That analysis drew on two building blocks. First, from 
the perspective of the theory of social proximity and group affiliation (as per Akerlof, 1997), 
the assimilation of a migrant was understood to reduce his social distance from the native 
population. Second, noting the large amount of evidence that income comparisons influence 
people’s wellbeing, this influence was quantified by means of a measure of relative 
deprivation, which in turn was incorporated in a utility function that is additive in income, 
cost of assimilation effort, and the measure of relative deprivation.3 Fan and Stark inquired 
                                                 
1 A review of the related evidence is provided by Blau and Kahn (2015). 
2 Lazear (1999) sought to explain the low level of the assimilation of migrants by building a model in which 
migrants who form clusters are reluctant to assimilate because in concentrated migrant communities, the returns 
from learning the host country’s language are low. However, this reasoning does not explain why migrants are 
reluctant to assimilate even if a low proficiency in the host country’s language negatively affects their earnings to 
a significant degree (refer, for example, McManus et al., 1983; Tainer, 1988). In our approach, this reluctance is 
attributed to a fear of comparison with the richer natives, which prevails even when greater assimilation confers 
a gain in earnings.  
3 The idea that relative income influences the individual’s wellbeing dates back at least to Veblen (1899), who 
has shown that higher earnings of others can depress one’s utility. Becker (1974) and Yitzhaki (1979) lay down 
theoretical foundations of a relative deprivation approach to comparisons between individuals. Recent empirical 
studies have demonstrated the importance of relative deprivation: Walker and Smith (2002), Eibner and Evans 
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how closely migrants choose to align themselves with the native inhabitants (henceforth 
referred to as natives), who, being more productive and wealthier than the migrants, expose 
the migrants to relative deprivation. The equilibrium assimilation level of the migrants was 
shown to be lower than the level that would have been chosen had the utility function not 
incorporated a relative deprivation component.4 
In this paper, we expand that analysis and, in addition, we expand the unit of analysis, 
beyond that starting point, addressing the question why are there stark differences in the 
extent of assimilation of different communities of migrants. Divergence is evident across 
different ethnic groups of migrants even in the same host country (Gordon, 1964; Alba and 
Logan, 1993; Iceland and Nelson, 2008); across migrants with different levels of education 
(Gijsberts and Vervoort, 2009; van Tubergen and Kalmijn, 2009); and across different 
generations of migrants from a given country of origin (Gans, 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1993; 
Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997, for migrants in the US; and the references provided in 
Thomson and Crul, 2007, for migrants in European countries). The variation between “total 
acculturation” and “rigid segregation” (Alba and Nee, 2003) has been particularly well 
documented in the case of migrants to the US (Massey and Denton, 1987; Kroneberg, 2008; 
Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Jiménez, 2010).  
Consider the link with evidence that migrants who live in highly concentrated urban 
communities (that is, in communities with a great many fellow migrants) do not assimilate 
much; for example, their proficiency in the host country’s language stays low, which in turn 
has a negative effect on their earnings (McManus et al., 1983; Tainer, 1988; Shields and Price, 
2002; Chiswick and Miller, 2002, 2005; Cutler et al., 2008). Then, migrants’ segregation and 
lowered incomes can cement into a “culture of poverty” (Wilson, 1987). A concentration of 
poor migrants can have adverse effect on the urban native inhabitants; for example, an 
increase in poor people in a central city location can cause an outflow of richer native 
inhabitants and deterioration of the center area (Kanemoto, 1980). A different effect is 
identified by Ottaviano and Peri (2005). Drawing on US census data for 1970-1990, they 
report that the productivity of US-born workers was higher in cities with richer linguistic 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2005), Luttmer (2005), and Clark et al. (2008). Cole et al. (1992, 1998), and Postlewaite (1998) explore the 
microeconomic foundations of the role of relative income in the determination of individuals’ welfare. 
4 The distaste for relative deprivation is not the only possible explanation for non-assimilation. For example, for 
migrants who derive utility from interacting with others who share the same culture or speak the same language, 
non-assimilation has a consumption value even if it reduces labor productivity. However, we do not consider this 
specific line of reasoning particularly revealing because, in and of itself, it is subsumed by our argument: as 
shown in subsequent sections, it is the fear of loss of this value that renders sanctions against a deviant migrant 
effective. 
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diversity, and that the presence of assimilated non-natives (who speak English and who have 
been in the US for a long time) had the most beneficial effect on the productivity of US-born 
workers. Especially when the extent of the assimilation of migrants bears meaningfully on the 
wellbeing of the native inhabitants, policy makers will want to understand what governs 
assimilation behavior.  
Usually, migrants are not compelled to live in high-concentration areas; rather, they 
choose to (Bartel, 1989; Dunlevy, 1991; Bauer et al., 2005). We maintain that “fear” of social 
proximity to the native inhabitants causes migrants to live in (or move into) neighborhoods 
with large concentrations of migrants, thereby increasing their concentration; the choice of 
geographical space springs from preferences with regard to social space. Migrants live in 
concentrations because of their fear of assimilation or failure to assimilate, rather than fail to 
assimilate because they live in concentrations of migrants. Our view is not that concentration 
explains non-assimilation, but rather that non-assimilation explains concentration: migrants 
elect not to assimilate and consequently they concentrate. Whereas the line of reasoning of the 
conventional approach is that a low level of assimilation is the result of living in 
concentrations (Chiswick and Miller, 1995; Lazear, 1999, 2005), our approach is that both a 
low level of assimilation and concentrated living are the result of a reluctance to assimilate. 
This perspective is not based on the notion that patterns of concentration reflect diversity in 
(an exogenous) ability to assimilate, with low-ability migrants choosing high concentrations; 
rather, the intensity of assimilation and the intensity of concentration are both taken as matters 
of choice.  
Recent research on assimilation, concentration, and segregation recognizes the 
importance of social and cultural considerations. For example, Verdier and Zenou (2017) who 
study assimilation, employ the concept of networks as a representation of social space; the 
outcomes of their modeling depend on the shape (density) of the network, and on the cost of 
expending effort to assimilate. Bezin and Moizeau (2017), who present a model of 
neighborhood formation in the context of cultural dynamics, link ethnic urban segregation 
with a preference for the preservation of certain cultural traits. However, these studies do not 
consider distaste of social proximity as a determinant of assimilation. 
In order to explain why different communities of migrants exhibit different degrees of 
assimilation, we study the inner workings of the communities, asking how the characteristics 
of a community of migrants influence the community’s equilibrium level of assimilation. 
Rather like in evolutionary biology, we “stress test” the prevailing equilibrium when a 
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“mutant” migrant appears. The mutation takes the form of a migrant who has an enhanced 
ability to assimilate, brought about exogenously. The superior ability is expressed as a cost of 
assimilation that is lower than that of the other migrants. Henceforth we refer to this migrant 
as a mutant migrant. 
We find that if undeterred, a mutant migrant will assimilate more than the other 
members of his community. When the mutant migrant acts on his enhanced ability to 
assimilate without impediment and obtains higher earnings, he exposes the other migrants in 
his community to more relative deprivation. The community will therefore have an incentive 
to safeguard the prevailing assimilation equilibrium and dissuade the mutant member from 
acting on his enhanced ability. The community’s success in preserving the prevailing 
equilibrium depends on its ability to impose a sanction on the mutant so as to discourage him 
from acting on his enhanced ability; we refer to this ability as cohesion. The community’s 
sanction takes the form of shunning, namely curtailing its affinity with, the mutant member. 
The sanction will harm the mutant member because it will push him further “into the arms” of 
the native population, increasing his proximity to the natives, which will exacerbate his 
relative deprivation.  
Our model tracks the stability of the pre-mutation assimilation equilibrium as a 
function of the strength of the sanction / the degree of cohesion of the community. A tightly 
knit migrant community is able to impose an effective sanction to discourage a mutant 
member from acting on his enhanced ability to assimilate. Such a community can preserve the 
stability of the assimilation equilibrium. On the other hand, a loose-knit community will not 
be able to marshal the discipline and level of enforcement of a sanction that will render its 
sanction powerful enough to discourage the mutant from deviating. Unimpeded, the mutant 
member will then act on his enhanced ability to assimilate. But then, in response to the 
relative deprivation inflicted by the mutant’s behavior on the “normal” members, these 
members will follow in his footsteps: in order to reduce their loss of utility from experiencing 
increased relative deprivation from a comparison with the mutant, the “normal” members will 
assimilate more. Thus, the stability of the equilibrium will be disrupted. 
From these considerations we conclude that the extent of assimilation of a community 
of migrants is inversely related to the community’s cohesion: in the presence of a mutation, a 
less tightly knit community will assimilate more. The community’s cohesion is key to the 
community’s immunity to adverse relative deprivation consequences that would be inflicted 
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on it if a mutant appears. It is this cohesion that determines the stability of the community’s 
equilibrium level of assimilation. 
 
2. Assimilation as a game: Introduction 
We consider a city populated by two types of individuals: natives and migrants. The natives 
constitute the “mainstream culture,” and are richer than the migrants. To concentrate on 
essentials, we assume that the incomes of the natives are constant and exogenous to the 
model. 
Each of 2n   migrants decides how much effort to exert in order to assimilate into the 
mainstream culture. If a migrant is better assimilated into the mainstream culture, he will earn 
a higher income; assimilation leads to the acquisition of host city specific human capital. 
However, assimilating more entails closer social proximity to the natives when making 
personal comparisons. We assume that personal comparisons matter to a migrant, and that he 
is concerned about adverse outcomes of such comparisons. We refer to this concern as 
sensing or experiencing relative deprivation. A decision by a migrant to exert an income-
boosting higher level of effort can negatively affect other migrants who, when comparing 
themselves to him, will feel relatively deprived. This perspective invites modeling 
assimilation behavior as a game between the migrants. In this game, the utility / payoff 
function of migrant i, {1,2,..., }i n , is  
)(),()(),( iiiiiiii xCcxRDxYxu   xx , (1) 
where [0,1]ix   is the effort exerted by migrant i to assimilate (this effort converts into host 
city specific human capital); ( )Y   is migrant i’s income; ( , )RD    is migrant i’s relative 
deprivation; ( )C   is the cost of exerting assimilation effort; (0,1]ic   is an individual 
parameter representing the potential reduction in i’s cost of assimilation (a migrant’s capacity 
to assimilate); and 
ix  is the vector of the levels of the assimilation effort chosen by the other 
migrants:  1 1, , , , , .i i i+1 nx x x x   x   
We make the following additional assumptions. 
 ( ) 0 and ( ) 0 for 0 1i i iY x Y x x     ;
0
lim ( ) ,
i
i
x
Y x

    (2) 
and 
 6 
 ( ) 0 and ( ) 0 for 0 1i i iC x C x x     ;
1
.lim ( )
ix
iC x

    (3) 
To define ( , )RD   , we introduce a function [ ( )]iF A Y x , where A  is the average 
income of the comparison group of migrant i, such that ( )F v  is differentiable for every 
vR , and 
 ( ) 0 for ( ) 0 for 0;  and ( ) .0;  0F v v F v v F v      (4) 
From the assumptions in (2) and (4) it follows that as a function of 
ix , [ ( )]iF A Y x  is 
convex.5 The function ( )F   encompasses the ideas that a migrant experiences disutility when 
other members of his comparison group(s) earn more than he does, and that the extent of this 
disutility rises with the difference between the average income of the comparison group and 
the migrant’s own income.  
The migrant’s set of comparison groups consists of fellow migrants and natives. In 
order to represent the social proximity of a migrant to these two groups, we incorporate 
weights in the migrant’s utility function. Regarding proximity to the natives as a comparison 
group, in a manner akin to Akerlof’s (1997), we assume that the more effort a migrant exerts 
to assimilate into the mainstream culture, the closer he is in social space to the natives, and the 
more he compares himself with them. By fine-tuning the extent of his assimilation, the 
migrant can manage his social distance from the natives: a limited assimilation results in a 
weight attached to the comparison with the natives that is less than one; a maximum 
assimilation (which means that the distance in social space between the migrant and the 
natives is zero) results in a weight attached to comparison with the natives that is equal to one. 
Regarding proximity to fellow migrants, the weight of fellow migrants as a comparison group 
in the relative deprivation component of the utility function of a migrant is the complement of 
the weight attached to the natives as a comparison group, such that the two weights add up to 
one.  
We denote by ( )ip x  the weight of being affiliated with the natives and, thus, of a 
migrant comparing himself with them, where 0 ( ) 1ip x  . Formally, we define ( )p   as a 
twice continuously differentiable function, such that 
                                                 
5 The convexity property follows from 
2
2
2
[ ( )]
[ ( )][ ( )] [ ( )] ( ) 0i i i i i
i
d F Y x
F Y x Y x F Y
A
x Y x
dx
A A

       ; when 
( )
i
A Y x , this inequality is strict. 
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0
(0) 0,
(1)
0 ( ) 1 for 0 1,
li
1,
,m ( )
( ) 0 for 0 1,
( ) ,0
ix
i i
i
i i
p x x
p x
p x x
p x
p
p

   
 
   





 (5) 
where the last but one condition in (5) means that the greater the assimilation effort, the 
higher the weight attached to the natives as a comparison group. In expressing p as a function 
of 
ix  we make two important assumptions. First, that the level of social proximity to the 
group of natives is determined endogenously (namely by the choice of the assimilation effort 
ix ). And second, that the exertion of effort to assimilate and the level of social proximity to 
the natives are linked. Hence, and for example, it is not possible to choose to exert a high 
level of assimilation effort while at the same time exclude the natives as a comparison group. 
 In addition to (5), we assume that the stronger the level of identification with the 
natives (the closer the social proximity to the natives), the weaker the identification with 
fellow migrants (the greater the distance in social space from fellow migrants). This 
assumption is expressed by a weight 1 ( )ip x  that migrant i accords to comparing himself 
with his fellow migrants.  
For migrant i, the average income of his fellow migrants is denoted by ( )iY x , namely 
{1,..., }\{ }
1
( ) ( )
1
j
j
i
n i
Y Y x
n




x . The average income of the natives is denoted by Z , and is 
assumed not to be lower than the highest earnings achievable by a migrant, namely (1)Y Z . 
We can now express migrant’s i relative deprivation as  
  ( , ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )ii i i ii iRD x p x F Z Y x p x F Y Y x           x x . (6) 
We assume that as a function of ix , ( , )i iRD x x  remains convex. For this to hold, it suffices 
to assume that, for a given )(Y , the functions )(p  and )(F  observe specific conditions 
related to their convexity.6 
                                                 
6 The sufficient conditions for the convexity of ( , )
i i
RD x

x  are that ) 0(F x  , ( ) 0F x  , ( ) 0p x  , and 
   log ( ) 2 ( ) log [ ( )]p x Y x F a Y x     for any a Z . The proof of this claim is available from the authors on 
request. These conditions are observed for a wide range of functions ( )F  , ( )p  , and ( )Y  . 
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Inserting (6) into (1), we express the utility of migrant i as 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )( )ii i i i i i i i i iu x Y x p x F YZ Yx p x F Y x c C x             xx . (7)  
Because the function ( , )i i iu x x  is the sum of concave functions of ix  (namely of ( )iY x , 
( ) ( )i ip x F YZ x    ,  1 ) )(( ) (i i ip x F xY Y    x , and ( )i ic C x ), then it is concave in ix . 
 The utility formulation in (7) expresses both the standard tension between the 
unpleasant exertion of effort aimed at acquiring productive “tools,” and the consequent 
pleasing acquisition of income, as well as an additional dimension of tension, namely the 
added relative deprivation terms (the middle terms on the right-hand side of (7)): the effort to 
acquire productive “tools” results in a reduction in the displeasure that arises from a relatively 
low income within a comparison group, yet it increases the weight that is accorded to the 
natives as a comparison group, which yields substantial discontent. 
 
3. The assimilation game: A homogenous community of migrants 
In this section, we consider a community that consists of migrants who are identical with 
respect to their assimilation capabilities: the cost of exerting effort to assimilate is the same 
for each of them and is 1ic   for {1,2,..., }i n . We show that in such a case, the equilibrium 
of the assimilation game can be obtained from a “reduced form” payoff function which 
abstracts from the effect of comparisons with fellow migrants. With the third term on the 
right-hand-side of (7) set equal to zero and with 1ic  , the utility function ( , )i i iu x x  
simplifies to 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( .)idi i i i i iu x Y x p x F Y C xZ x        (8) 
The function ( )idi iu x  is the utility of a migrant when all the migrants choose the same level of 
effort so that comparisons between them do not inflict relative deprivation. Drawing on a 
similar reasoning to the one pertaining to ( , )i i iu x x  above, ( )
id
i iu x  is also concave. We 
denote by *x  the level of assimilation that maximizes ( )
id
i iu x . The corresponding first order 
condition is  
 *( ) 0idi xu  , 
namely 
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 * * * * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.x x x x xY p F Z Y p Y F Z Y Cx x                 (9) 
The concavity of the ( )idi iu x  function in (8) ensures that 
*x , the level of effort that yields the 
maximal utility, is unique. In addition, the limit assumptions in (2), (3), and (5) imply that this 
level is strictly positive, and that it is interior: *0 1x  . 
It turns out that the symmetric solution given by the n-dimensional point 
* * *( ,. , )..x xx  is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between migrants who are 
identical with respect to their efficiency at assimilation. This result and a result relating to the 
welfare of the community of migrants, are stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: The assimilation equilibrium of a homogeneous community migrants. 
The choice of the levels of assimilation effort given by the point * * *( ,. , )..x xx  is the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the homogeneous community of migrants, namely of a community 
characterized by payoff functions ),( iii xu x  as in (7) with 1ic   for {1,2,..., }i n . This 
equilibrium maximizes the community’s welfare, defined as the sum of the utilities of the 
migrants, 
1
( ) ( , )
n
i i ii
SU u x x x  for [0,1]
nx . 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
The proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the only stable equilibrium of the 
homogeneous community of migrants can be reached by the maximization of the “reduced 
form” utility function ( ( )idiu   in (8)). In addition to characterizing the equilibrium, Proposition 
1 states that the equilibrium is socially optimal. Therefore, and as elaborated next, in the event 
of disruption, the migrant community will have an incentive to “defend” this optimal choice 
of the common level of assimilation. 
 
4. The assimilation game: The appearance of a mutant migrant 
In Section 3, all the n  migrants were characterized by identical assimilation capabilities (their 
cost of exerting assimilation effort was assumed to be the same), and they all chose the same 
level of effort ( *x ), which resulted in each of them having the same income. In such a 
uniform community of migrants, no relative deprivation was caused from comparisons within 
the community, and the migrants experienced relative deprivation only from comparisons 
with the richer natives. 
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Suppose now that a mutant migrant appears among the community of the n  migrants. 
As already explained, this migrant is characterized by a greater ability to assimilate. We 
express the assimilation advantage of a mutant migrant by a lower cost of exerting 
assimilation effort. For example, the lower cost can derive from greater learning abilities (of 
the language, culture, laws, the way of conducting business, or specific skills needed and 
valued in the labor market of the host city).  
We denote the index of the mutant migrant by {1,..., }m n . We assume that the 
reduced cost of assimilation of the mutant migrant, 
mc , is a random variable distributed on the 
interval ( ,1)c , where [0,1)c , with a probability density function ( )mg c  such that ( ) 0mg c   
for ( ,1)mc c , and with a cumulative distribution function ( )mG c . Thus, c  is the boundary to 
the greater ability of a mutant migrant to assimilate in comparison to the “normal” migrants. 
If a migrant who can assimilate at a lower cost than the other migrants deviates from 
the common assimilation level *x , he will earn more than his fellow migrants. In turn, the 
other migrants, experiencing relative deprivation from comparisons with him, can be expected 
to consider adjusting their assimilation behavior. We denote by 
mN  the set of the non-mutant 
migrants (all of whom are characterized by 1ic  ), that is, {1,..., } \{ }mN n m  . As a 
benchmark, we formulate a proposition that describes the new assimilation equilibrium of the 
community of migrants reached following the appearance of a mutant community member 
who is not constrained by any community reaction. 
Proposition 2: The assimilation equilibrium when one of the migrants is a mutant, and when 
his choice of assimilation behavior is not constrained by a response from the “normal” 
migrants. 
When a community of migrants does not interfere with the choice of assimilation effort of a 
mutant migrant, then the equilibrium level of assimilation will shift from * * *( ,. , )..x xx  (the 
assimilation effort exerted by every member of a homogeneous community of migrants) to a 
point * * *
1( ,..., )nx xx  with 
* *
ix x  for mi N , and 
*
mx  such that: 
(i) * * *
mx xx   
and 
(ii) *
mx  is inversely related to the parameter mc . 
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Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 2 states that an unhindered mutant migrant will assimilate more than 
“normal” migrants; mutation breeds deviation. Moreover, the greater the mutant migrant’s 
advantage in assimilation ability (the bigger the reduction in the cost of exerting effort to 
assimilate), the larger the deviation. Importantly, the non-mutant migrants will also exert a 
greater effort than they would have exerted if a mutant had not appeared. Consequently, their 
utility will be lowered. This is so because (recalling (8)) 
  
 * * * * * *
*
* *
* * * * *
*( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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         
     
x x
 
for any 
mi N , where the last inequality in the expression above follows from the fact that 
*x  maximizes the simplified utility function ( )
id
iu   (which, to recall, applies when there are no 
differences in incomes between the migrants). 
Because deviation by a mutant migrant lowers the utility of his fellow migrants, they 
have an incentive to discourage him from increasing his level of assimilation beyond theirs. 
We next study the manner in which they act on this incentive. 
 
5. The assimilation game: A community response to the appearance of a mutant migrant  
In order to track the community’s reaction to the appearance of the mutant migrant, we 
proceed in two steps. In Subsection 5.1 we outline the type of sanction that can be applied by 
the community of “normal” migrants to discourage the mutant migrant from deviating. To 
find out when sanctioning by the community is likely to be efficient to the community, we 
present and analyze in Subsection 5.2 a correspondingly modified game played between the 
migrants when a deviant migrant can be sanctioned. 
5.1 Sanctioning a mutant migrant 
We now assume that a community of migrants can impose a sanction: if a migrant deviates 
from *x , the common level of assimilation that maximizes the utilities of “normal” migrants, 
they will shun him. The idea that a community can apply social pressure as a means of 
persuasion is not original to this paper. “Rabbeinu Tam sanctions,” which date back to 
medieval times, amount to a community distancing itself from deviants. In the 12th century 
context, these deviants were men who refused to give their wives a bill of divorce, known as a 
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“get,” to make a separation official. The sanctions consisted of shunning and ostracizing, in 
particular refusal to trade or pray with a man who refuses to give his wife a “get,” and not 
“giving any honors” to him. 
Suppose, then, that a mutant migrant who strays from the community’s assimilation 
norm, *x , by exerting a higher level of effort mx  such that 
*
mx x , is penalized (shunned) by 
the community. As a result, the mutant will find himself closer in social space to the natives 
than would be the case had the community not reacted. Specifically, the weight that the 
mutant migrant will end up attaching to the natives as a comparison group will be 
 ( 1 )()m mp x p x  , where (0,1)   is a parameter. In other words, we assume that this 
weight will be increased by a fraction   of the weight that hitherto the migrant has attached 
to his fellow migrants as a comparison group. The parameter   measures the severity of the 
sanction: the “revenge” of fellow migrants shunning the mutant is affected by a shift in social 
space onto the natives of a weight that the migrant has assigned to his fellow migrants. 
In comparison with a situation in which the mutant does not deviate from the 
community’s equilibrium level of assimilation, with deviation the weight attached to the 
natives increases twofold: first, from *( )p x  (which is the weight that the community attaches 
to the natives when the equilibrium level of assimilation is *x , as given by (9)) to )( mp x  
(which is the weight that is associated with the mutant migrant’s heightened level of effort 
mx ); and, second, as a result of the community’s distancing sanction, from )( mp x  to 
 ( 1 )()m mp x p x  . Naturally, if the mutant migrant refrains from seeking enhanced 
assimilation, then he is not subject to a sanction. In short, the mutant migrant’s utility is  
 
 
 
*
*
( ) ) ) ( )
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where )(m ix x  for mi N  is the assimilation point chosen by the “normal” migrants. We 
note that the added factor  1 ( )mp x   does not compromise the concavity of ˆ ( , )m m mu x x  
for *
mx x .
7  
The severity of the community’s sanction, reflected in the magnitude of  , depends 
on the cohesion of the community, namely on the ability of the members of the community to 
enact, coordinate, and apply an injunction that amounts to a wall without cracks or gaps.8 In a 
very cohesive community, even the closest family of the deviant will shun him, so he has no 
choice but to get close to the natives; in a less cohesive community, only distant friends of the 
deviant will make him feel like a stranger, so his comparison perspective does not change that 
much, and the penalty that he is subjected to is not all that formidable.  
It is worth mentioning that the characterization of the penalty above has two additional 
consequences. First, because by construction the weight attached to the natives cannot exceed 
one, the sanction will be of limited severity if the social proximity to the natives of the deviant 
migrant is already quite high (namely if )( mp x  is close to 1). Second, the possibilities for 
penalizing a deviant are reduced if the community’s initial degree of assimilation is high 
(namely if *( )p x  itself is close to 1). In other words, when it comes to preventing a deviation, 
a community that to begin with chooses a close level of proximity to the natives has its hands 
largely tied.  
5.2. Equilibrium of the community-mutant migrant assimilation game 
We revise the formulation of the game in order to include the possibility of sanctioning the 
mutant migrant in the strategy space, and in order to characterize the manner in which the 
community applies the sanction. The required modification is lessened because Proposition 2 
ensures that when confronted with the mutation, all the non-mutant migrants choose the same 
level of effort. Consequently, all the non-mutant migrants have the same preference regarding 
sanctioning the mutant. We thus analyze the game between two players: “the community” (of 
non-mutant migrants), and the mutant migrant.9 
                                                 
7 To see this, we note that if the conditions listed in footnote 6 are observed, then so are the corresponding 
conditions where ( )p x  is replaced by  ( 1) )(p x p x  . 
8 The sanctioning mechanism presented here - “shunning” of the deviant - is the only costless sanction available 
to the “normal” migrants in a setting based on social proximity and social comparisons. 
9 Another way of thinking about this setting is a game between a representative non-mutant migrant and the 
mutant. 
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The modified setting consists of the following sequence of stages. At the very 
beginning, the mutant migrant’s assimilation ability, 
mc , is drawn randomly from the 
distribution ( )mG c  and becomes known to the players. Then, a two-step game is played. In 
step I, the community decides whether to apply the sanction (in which case the utility function 
of the mutant migrant is given by (10)) or, alternatively, to allow the mutant migrant to 
choose his level of effort unhindered (in which case his utility function is given by (7)). In 
step II, the community and the mutant choose their effort levels. Thus, the community adopts 
a strategy (γ, )coms x , where  γ “Sanction”, “Allow” , and [0,1]x . Here, we use x  
instead of 
ix  because we can limit ourselves to symmetric choices by the non-mutant 
migrants. The strategy of the mutant migrant is given by ( ),S Am m ms x x , where 
S
mx  is the 
assimilation effort of the mutant migrant when he is subjected to a sanction, and Amx  is his 
effort level when the community does not sanction him (obviously, { , 1} [0, ]S Am mx x  ). 
In the following proposition we characterize the equilibria of the community-mutant 
game for given   and 
mc . 
Proposition 3: The equilibrium of the community-mutant migrant game when a mutant 
migrant can be sanctioned. 
We consider the following condition:  
 
A
* su ˆ )p) ( ,(idm m m mu u xx  x , (11) 
where  *1A ( , , : , f)  or n m i mx x x x x x i mx      . The community-mutant game presented 
in this section has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and is of one 
of following two types: 
(a) If condition (11) holds, then the community plays *(“Sancti n”, )o x , and the mutant 
migrant plays *( , )Amx x , for some 
*A
mx x .  
(b) If condition (11) does not hold, then the community plays *( “Allow”, )x , and the mutant 
migrant plays *,( )Sm mx x , for some 
*S
m mx x . 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
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Remark. In an equilibrium of type (a), the realized vector of assimilation efforts is the same 
as in Proposition 1, whereas in an equilibrium of type (b), the realized vector of assimilation 
efforts is the same as in Proposition 2. 
Condition (11) depends implicitly on   and on 
mc . It informs us that a mutant 
migrant with a given 
mc  who faces a sanction of magnitude   will be better off when he 
adheres to the common assimilation level *x  than when he deviates. As revealed by the proof 
of Proposition 3, if condition (11) is not met and the community applies the sanction, then the 
sanction will actually induce the mutant to choose a higher level of effort than he would 
choose to exert if no sanction was imposed on him. Therefore, the community plays 
“Sanction” only if in doing so it is able to dissuade the mutant from deviating. Administering 
an inefficient sanction is against the interests of the community.10 
In the next proposition we show that the prevailing equilibrium type (be it equilibrium 
type (a) or equilibrium type (b), as defined in Proposition 3) depends on the severity of the 
sanction   and on the assimilation advantage of the mutant 
mc . 
Proposition 4: Determination of the type of equilibrium of the community-mutant migrant 
game. 
For a given level of severity of the sanction  , there exists a critical level of advantage in 
assimilation ability, ( , ]) 1( 0c   , such that if ( )mc c  , then the equilibrium is of type (a) in 
Proposition 3, and if ( )mc c  , then the equilibrium is of type (b) in Proposition 3. The 
critical value ( )c   is weakly declining in  . 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Finally, on recalling that c  is the lowest possible cost of assimilation for the mutant 
migrant, in the next proposition we link the cohesion of the community with its ability to 
dissuade a mutant migrant from deviating.  
Proposition 5: Community cohesion and stability of the assimilation level. 
                                                 
10 A related observation is that it is important to require the equilibria to be subgame perfect. If the mutant were 
to play ( , )
S A
m m
x x  such that 
*
,
S A
m m
x x x , then the best response of the community would include “Allow” in step I. 
A Nash equilibrium of this type exists even when condition (11) is violated, although in such a case the 
equilibrium is not perfect: an announcement by the mutant migrant that he will play 
*S
m
x x  is an empty threat. 
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The critical level of the advantage in assimilation ability, ( )c  , determines the probability 
that a community will succeed in preventing a mutant migrant from acting on his improved 
ability, )(P  , so that: 
(i) if ( )c c  , then the probability that the equilibrium of the game will be of type (b) is 
zero: )( 1P   ;  
(ii) if  ( )c c   , then the probability that the equilibrium of the game will be of type (b) is 
greater than zero: ( 1 ( ( ) 1) )P G c    ; 
(iii) )(P   is weakly increasing in  . 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 5 maps the community’s cohesion, measured by the strength of its 
sanction, onto effectiveness in preventing a mutant migrant from acting on his advantage in 
assimilation ability. Part (iii) of the proposition informs us that the more cohesive the 
community, the higher the probability that its sanction will be effective, that is, the outcome 
of the game will be equilibrium (a). Specifically (as per part (i) of Proposition 5), if the 
community’s cohesion is such that )( 1P   , then the community can impose a powerful 
enough sanction to prevent a mutant with any possible assimilation advantage from acting on 
his edge. We refer to such a community as a tightly knit community, meaning that this is a 
community that can maintain the stability of the socially optimal assimilation equilibrium (a), 
namely, keep the assimilation level of all members at *x . 
However, as part (ii) of Proposition 5 informs us, if the community’s cohesion is such 
that )( 1P   , then with probability )(P   a mutant with a powerful enough edge in 
assimilation ability will be able to ignore the community’s sanction. In such a case, the 
assimilation equilibrium will be of type (b): the community refrains from sanctioning, and 
assimilation proceeds as per Proposition 2, diverging from the social optimum. We describe a 
community which is vulnerable to the appearance of a mutant as a loose-knit community. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our starting assumption has been that assimilation increases migrants’ social proximity to the 
natives; closer proximity implies exposure to relative deprivation caused by more intensive 
comparison with the natives whose incomes are higher than those of the migrants; and distress 
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at the prospect of relative deprivation acts as a check on the inclination to assimilate, resulting 
in a low equilibrium level of assimilation by the community of migrants. We then introduced 
a mutation (an exogenously derived enhanced ability to assimilate in one of the migrants) and 
cohesion of the community (the ability of the members of the community to apply a sanction 
in order to safeguard the equilibrium).  
By tracking the stability of the assimilation equilibrium when a mutation occurs, we 
found that the community’s level of assimilation is inversely related to its cohesion, in the 
sense that in a more tightly knit community a mutation has to be stronger in order to be 
realized. In other words, for a given mutation, a more tightly knit community is less likely to 
see its assimilation equilibrium disrupted than a less tightly knit community.  
The mechanism leading to these occurrences is that the community of migrants can 
penalize a mutant migrant for exceeding the communal level of effort to assimilate. The 
application of a sanction by the community is similar to “Rabbeinu Tam sanctions” that date 
back to medieval times and amount to a community distancing itself from deviants.  
An interesting issue that this paper does not tackle is how to quantify the cohesiveness 
of a community. One approach could be to exploit a spatial dimension of propinquity. When 
migrants reside in close proximity to each other, a variety of interactions, social and other, are 
more likely than when migrants are thinly dispersed. Similarly, if the closeness of a 
community is the result of geographical clustering, then deviations from a community norm 
are more visible than if the migrants do not live in close concentration. These considerations 
introduce a spatial dimension to the concepts of social cohesion and communal stress brought 
about by mutation. 
With regard to the efficacy of policies aimed at encouraging the assimilation of 
migrants, we can infer from our analysis that for an assimilation-boosting policy to be 
effective, the policy should be either to assist all migrants, albeit modestly, or to focus more 
intensively on a small number of migrants so as to enable the latter to overcome the 
community’s sanction, and consequently, by instilling relative deprivation “from the inside,” 
prompt assimilation by the entire group of migrants, even if the group is of the tightly knit 
type.11 A policy that falls in between, that is, modest effort directed at a large but limited 
                                                 
11 In the notation of our model, the second option of the policy will be equivalent to “engineering” a change in 
the distribution of the parameter 
m
c  such that c  is lowered to a level below ( )c  . 
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subset of migrants, is unlikely to be successful because it will trigger a mechanism of 
community sanction. 
Policy cannot be formulated, and society’s resources should not be spent, without an 
understanding of the rational choices that migrants make in their host country, and of what 
governs those choices. We have sought to contribute to this understanding by systematically 
identifying paths in social space that lead migrants to exhibit distinct patterns of assimilation. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 1 through 5  
Proof of Proposition 1 
To begin with, we prove that the n-dimensional point * * *( ,. , )..x xx , where *x  is the solution 
of (9), constitutes a Nash equilibrium among the homogeneous community of migrants 
characterized by payoff functions ,( )i i iu x x  with 1 ic   for {1,2,..., }i n . To this end, we 
check whether it is beneficial for any migrant i to unilaterally increase / decrease his effort 
level 
ix  above / below 
*x . Let * ix  be a ( 1n  )-dimensional point such that 
** *( , , )i x x  x . 
Suppose that *
ix x . Then 
*)( ( )i iY x Y  x , thus, as follows from (4), 
*( () ) 0i iF Y xY    x , and then 
* )( ( ), idi i i i iu u xx  x , which has a maximum when 
*
ix x  for 
{1,2,..., }i n . Because 
 
*,
( ( ( (
( )
) ) ) ) ( ) ) )( (
( 0) ,
i i i
i i i i i i i
i
id
i i
u x
Y x p x F Z Y x p x Y x F Z Y x C x
x
u x
            
   
  

x
 (A1) 
it is not optimal for a migrant to choose *
ix x . 
Suppose alternatively that *
ix x . We define a function ( , )i iv x x  as follows:  
  ) ( ) ( ) )( 1 (,i i i i ix Yv x p F Y x      x x , (A2) 
hence 
( , ( ,) ( ) )idi i i i i i ix u xu v x  x x . 
Then,  
* *, ,( ) (
.
)
( )idi i i i ii i
i i
u x v x
u x
x x
   
 
x x
 (A3) 
From the concavity of ( )idiu   it follows that ( ) 0
id
i ixu   for any 
*
ix x . On the other hand, 
using assumptions (2), (4), and (5), it can be verified that 
*
0
( ),i i
i
v x
x
 

x
.12 By implication, we 
                                                 
12 Explicitly,  
*
* *
)
( ) ) ( ) ( ) )
( ,
( ( (1 )( )i i
i i i i i i i
i
v x
p F Y Y xx x xp Y F Y Y
x
x

 

    

      
x
x x . 
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obtain that 
*,
,
(
0
)i i i
i
u x
x
 

x
 and, thus, *x  is the unique maximum of *,( )i i iu x x  with respect to 
ix . 
Next, we inquire whether there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium other than *x . 
There are two cases to consider.  
First, let *y  be a n-dimensional point such that * * *( , , )y y y  where * *y x . We 
check whether it pays off for a migrant i to shift his assimilation level away from *y . For any 
*
ix y , 
* ) ( )( 0i iY xF Y   y , thus 
 
*( , )
( ) 0idi i i i i
i
u
u
x
x
x 

 

y
 
for * *[ , )ix y x  and, therefore, it pays off for migrant i to increase his assimilation level above 
*y . Consequently, the vector *y  cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
Second, let * * *( , , )y y y  be such that * *y x . Again, we inquire whether migrant i 
has an incentive to unilaterally decrease his 
ix  below 
*y . Reapplying (A3) we find that  
* * * *
*( , ) ( , )( ) 0idi i ii
i i
u vy
u
x x
y
y 
 
  
 
y y ,  (A4) 
because from the concavity of ( )idiu   it follows that 
*( ) 0idi yu
  , and it can be verified that 
* *
0
( , )i
i
v
x
y  

y
. Consequently, it pays off for migrant i to reduce his assimilation level. By 
implication, *y  is not a Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover, we can show that the game has no asymmetric equilibria. Indeed, for a 
point 
1( ,..., )nx xx , suppose that there exists {1,..., }i n  such that 
*
ix x , and let h denote 
the migrant whose level of effort is the highest, namely max }{ h ix x . Then, migrant h will 
have an incentive to reduce his effort level because of a reasoning similar to the argument 
pertaining to (A1). On the other hand, if for some individual i it holds that *ix x , then this 
individual will gain by marginally increasing his effort level because of a reasoning similar to 
the one following (A3). Therefore, *x  is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game for a 
homogeneous community of migrants. 
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Finally, we prove that *x  constitutes a social optimum, meaning that it maximizes the 
function 
1
( ) ( , )
n
i i ii
SU u x x x  for [0,1]
nx . The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that a 
point 
1( , ), ny y y  ensures a higher aggregate utility than 
*x . We consider two possibilities.  
First, suppose that *
1max{ , }, ny y x  . Then, on the basis of an argument similar to 
the one leading to (A1), it is easy to see that we can increase the utility of each of the 
individuals from the set  1{1, , }: m }ax{ , ,i nI i n y y y      by a simultaneous marginal 
reduction of their assimilation level, while the levels of utility of other individuals increase 
too (because of a decrease in their relative deprivation). Therefore, such point y  cannot be 
socially optimal. 
Second, suppose that *
iy x  for all i and that 
*
1min{ , }, ny y x  . Then, on 
reiterating the argument leading to (A3), it can be demonstrated that we can increase the 
utility of each of the individuals from the set  1{1, , }: m }in{ , ,i nJ i n y y y      by a 
simultaneous marginal increase of their assimilation level without causing a decrease in the 
utility of any other individual. Hence, again, point y  cannot be socially optimal. 
This reasoning leads us to conclude that * * *( ,. , )..x xx  is the unique social optimum 
of the homogeneous community of migrants, as well as the unique Nash equilibrium of the 
game. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
To begin with, we show that for any vector of the assimilation effort of the non-mutant 
migrants 
mx , the best response of the mutant migrant, ( )m mx x , is strictly bigger than 
*x . 
The first order condition for the maximization of ( , )m mmu x x  with respect to mx  informs us 
that the mutant’s utility is maximized if and only if  
  
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On the other hand, by assumptions (2) through (5) and because *( ) 0idiu x  , for any 1mc   it 
holds that  
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 (A6) 
Hence, by the concavity of  )( ,mm mu x x  with respect to mx , we obtain that 
 *( )m mx x x , (A7) 
namely, indeed the mutant does deviate by choosing a level of assimilation that is higher than 
*x  for any mx .  
Next, we show that in any equilibrium of the game, the mutant’s assimilation effort is 
the biggest in the community of migrants. Suppose, on the contrary, that * * *
1( , , )ny y y  is 
an equilibrium and that * * *1max{ , },j ny y y   for some j m . Then, a non-mutant migrant j  
who exerts the assimilation effort *jy  does not sense relative deprivation from comparison 
with other migrants, and * * *( , ) ( )
id
j j j jju uy y y . But 
*y  is an equilibrium, so *jy  has to be 
individual’s j  optimal choice, that is, * 0( )
id
i ju y
  , implying that **jy x  which, given (A7) 
and the assumption that * *j my y , leads to contradiction. 
Because the assimilation effort of the mutant migrant is the highest in the migrant 
community, other migrants do not inflict relative deprivation on him and, thus, his utility can 
be expressed by the following function (recalling (8)): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).m m m m m m
id
mu Y p Fx Y c Cx x Z x x       (A8) 
As argued in Section 3, the function ( )m
idu   has a unique maximum. We conclude that in any 
equilibrium of the game, * * *1( , , ),nx x x the mutant migrant chooses the level of assimilation 
effort *mx  such that 
*( ) 0mm
idu x  .13  
                                                 
13 In general, it could occur that * 0( )
m
id
m
u x  , but it could be possible only if 
* *
m j
x x  for some j m , an option 
that has been ruled out in the preceding part of this proof.  
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To find the remaining elements of *x , we proceed as in Section 3, and we first look at 
the symmetric best responses to *
mx . If all the non-mutant migrants choose the same level of 
effort 
ix x  for mi N , then the average income of the migrants who constitute the 
comparison group of individual i is *( ) ( )
2 1
(
1
)
1
i m
n
Y xxY Y
n n


 
 
x , thus 
( ) ( )iY Y x x
* )
1 1
(
1 1
( )m xY x Y
n n

 
 , and the utility of each of the non-mutant migrants can 
be written as 
   *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 ( .
1
) ( ) ( )
1
id
mu Y p Fx x Z Y p F Y x Y C
n
x
n
x x x x
 
            
 (A9) 
We note that ( )idu   is a function of one argument only, because we regard *mx  as given, and 
because we consider only symmetric choices of assimilation effort among non-mutants. 
Furthermore, ( )idu   is concave, and the assumptions about ( )F  , ( )p  , and ( )C   ensure that 
( )idu   has a unique maximum, which we denote by *x . We can now apply the same logic as 
in the proof of Proposition 1 (equations (A1) through (A4) and the discussion that follows) to 
show that the vector of the levels of assimilation effort 
* * * *( , , , ),mx x x  x  
such that the mutant chooses *mx  and all the non-mutants choose 
*x , is a Nash equilibrium, 
and no other Nash equilibria exists. 
To show that * *x x , namely that the non-mutant migrants follow the mutant in 
deviating from the equilibrium *x  of the homogenous case, we note that  
   *
1 1
1( ) ( ) ( ) )
1
)(
1
(id idi mu u x p x F Y x Y x
n
x
n
 
      
, (A10) 
hence 
 
 
*
*
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 .
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
id id
i m
m
u x u x p x F Y x Y x
n n
p x Y x F Y x Y x
n n n
 
     
 
      

 

 (A11) 
Recalling that *( ) 0idiu x
  , we obtain that 
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 
* * * *
* * * *
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1  0,
1
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
( )
id
m
m
u x p x F Y x Y x
n n
p x Y x F Y x Y x
n n n
 
    
 
      

 

 (A12) 
where the inequality follows from assumptions (2) through (5) and from the fact that * *
mx x . 
This completes the proof of part (i) of Proposition 2. 
To prove part (ii) of the proposition, we apply the implicit function theorem to the 
equality  
 *( ) 0mm
idu x   (A13) 
and obtain 
 
*
* *
* *
( )
( )
( ) (
0
)
id
m
m m m
id i
m m m
m
m m
d
du x
dx dc C x
dc u x u x





   , (A14) 
where the inequality in (A14) holds true because by (3) we have that ( ) 0C   , and because 
( )m
idu   is a concave function. This completes the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 2. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
While quite obviously there are an infinite number of strategy profiles, we can group them in 
eight categories, depending on whether the community decides to play “Sanction” or “Allow” 
in step I, and depending on whether the mutant migrant chooses a level of effort higher than 
*x  (he deviates) or not in any of the circumstances in which he finds himself in step II 
(namely depending on whether the community’s decision in step I was “Sanction” or 
“Allow”). This grouping is represented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Types of strategy profiles of the community-mutant game 
 
 *,Smx x  
*A
mx x  
*,Smx x  
*A
mx x  
*,Smx x  
*A
mx x  
*,Smx x  
*A
mx x  
“Sanction” (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
“Allow” (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Note: Crossed numbers indicate categories than contain no subgame perfect Nash equilibria (consult the proof). 
We use Table 1 to identify all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game. In 
fact, before proving that the strategy profiles specified in Proposition 3 are the only 
equilibrium strategy profiles, we pinpoint which categories of profiles cannot represent any 
equilibria.  
To begin with, we note that by Proposition 2 the strategy profile types (i), (ii), (v), and 
(vi) cannot constitute Nash equilibria: if the community refrains from sanctioning the mutant 
migrant in step I, he will deviate in step II, namely his best response always includes *A
mx x .  
We next show that we can eliminate type (vii) as a candidate of equilibrium.  
First, we note that for a given level of effort by mutant migrant, 
mx , the utility of each 
community member who chooses his best response to 
mx  is decreasing in mx . Let mx  be the 
mutant migrant’s effort in step II, and let ( )mx x  be the best response of the community in step 
II (noting that this best response effort level does not depend on the community’s decision to 
sanction or not to sanction in step I). To investigate how the utility of a non-mutant is 
influenced by 
mx , we revisit function ( )
idu   defined in (A9) in the proof of Proposition 2. On 
applying the envelope theorem to  ( )id mu x x , we find that the relationship of interest is given 
by 
   (
1 1 1
1 0,( ) ) ( ) (
1 1 1
)m
id
m
m
du
p Y F Y Y
dx n n n
x x x x
 
        
  (A15) 
where the strict inequality in (A15) follows from the fact that if the community plays 
“Allow,” then by the proof of Proposition 2, Amx x  at the optimum. An implication of (A15) 
is that the community will want the mutant migrant to choose less effort.  
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Second, suppose that the mutant migrant plays *,Smx x  
*A
mx x , so 
S A
m mx x . In this 
case, the community is better off when playing “Sanction” rather than “Allow.” By 
implication, category (vii) contains no equilibria. 
Even when the mutant migrant is sanctioned, he will certainly not choose a level of 
effort that is lower than the level of effort chosen by the “normal” migrants. To see this, we 
construct a function  
 
 
( , ) ( ) ) ) ( )
) ) ( )( )
( 1 (
1 ( )( (1
s
m m m m m m m
m m m mm m
u x Y x F Z Y x
F c
p x p
C xx Y Y x
x
p x p




       
     
 
  
x
x
 
for [0,1]mx  . Namely ( , )
s
m m mu x x  is the “top” formula of ˆ ( , )m m mu x x  in (10), defined on an 
unrestricted interval of choices of assimilation effort. From a discussion akin to that which 
follows (A8) in the proof of Proposition 2 regarding the function ( , )sm m mu x x , it can be 
inferred that when the mutant migrant is subjected to a penalty, he will still choose a level of 
effort that is the highest amongst the community of migrants. Consequently, the mutant 
migrant will not experience relative deprivation from comparisons with other migrants, and at 
any equilibrium of the game his utility will be a function of only one variable - his level of 
effort. We conclude that when the mutant migrant is sanctioned and chooses a level of 
assimilation effort that is higher than *x , his utility will be given by 
  ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )m m m m m m m
id
mx x x xu Y p Z xp F Y c Cx            . (A16) 
We also note that ˆ ( )m
idu   is a concave function.14 
We consider the following difference 
  ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 .m m m
d
m m
i i
m
d x x p x xu F YZu          (A17) 
Suppose that there is an equilibrium in category (viii), and let * *( , )S Am mx x  be the equilibrium 
strategy of the mutant migrant. By differentiating (A17) we get  
 
 
* * * *
* * *
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( .)1
A A A A
m m m m m m
A A A
m m
id i
m
du u p F Z Y
p Y
x x x x
x x F Z Y x


     
   
 
  
 (A18) 
                                                 
14 In the discussion that follows equation (10) we argue that ˆ ),(
m m m
u x

x  is a concave function of 
m
x  for any 
m
x , thus ˆ ˆ( ) ( ),
id
m m m m m
u x u x

 x  for max( )
m m
x

 x  is also concave. 
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We note that by the definition of *A
mx , 
* 0( )id Am mxu  . By implication, we obtain that  
  * * * * * *ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ) 0(A A A A A Am m m m m m midu p F Z Y p Y F Z Yx x x x x x               , (A19) 
where the inequality in (A19) is implied by assumptions (2) through (5). 
Suppose now that there is an equilibrium in category (iv) and, again, let * *( , )S Am mx x  be 
the equilibrium strategy of the mutant migrant. We have that *ˆ ( ) 0id Sm mxu    which, given (A19) 
and the concavity of the ˆ ( )m
idu  , implies that * *A Sm mx x . Thus, we have shown that when the 
mutant migrant seeks to maximize ˆ ( )m
idu  , he will choose a higher level of effort in (viii) than 
in (iv). In terms of inequality (A15), the community will be worse off when the mutant is 
sanctioned, so the community will play “Allow.” Type (iv) of the strategy profile can thus be 
eliminated. 
To complete the proof, we show that the strategy profiles specified in Proposition 3 
are, in fact, subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and that no other equilibria exist.  
First, suppose that 
A
* ˆ( ) )sup ( ,m
i
m
d
m mu u xx  x , in other words condition (11) is 
observed. If the community plays “Sanction” in step I, then the best response of the mutant 
migrant is not to deviate, that is, his best response is to choose *S
mx x ,
15 and as we know 
from Proposition 2, *Amx x  (in fact, 
* )Am mx x . The best response of the community to this 
strategy of the mutant migrant is to play “Sanction” in step I and, by the proof of Proposition 
1, to play *x x  in step II. Hence, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. In terms of 
Table 1, this equilibrium strategy profile is in category (iii). By the same arguments that were 
invoked in the proof of Proposition 2, there are no other equilibria in this category.  
Second, suppose that *
A
sup ( ,  ˆ( ) )m m
id
m mu x u x  x , namely that condition (11) is violated. 
Then, the mutant migrant will deviate regardless of whether he is sanctioned or not. Taking 
into account the fact that A Sm mx x  and the relationship (A15), the best strategy of the 
community in such a case is to play “Allow.” And if the community plays “Allow,” then, by 
Proposition 2, the only Nash equilibrium of the subgame is when the mutant plays *Am mx x  
while the non-mutants play *x x . The strategy of the mutant migrant in the other subgame 
                                                 
15 It can be easily verified, by reformulating (A5) through (A8), that the mutant will never choose 
*S
m
x x . 
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(when he is penalized) is to exert the level of effort that maximizes ˆ ( )m
idu   as given by (A16), 
and we know from the earlier part of the proof that A S
m mx x . This equilibrium is in category 
(viii) and, again, it is the only perfect Nash equilibrium in this category. 
Having shown that there are no subgame perfect Nash equilibria other than the ones in 
categories (iii) and (viii), we have exhausted all the possibilities for equilibria of the game. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4  
We use the symbol )( ,Sm mx c  to denote the choice made by the sanctioned mutant migrant in 
step II of the game when the severity of the community’s sanction is  , and the mutant 
migrant’s assimilation ability parameter is equal to 
mc . Let ( )c   be defined as follows: 
 *( ) inf : ( , )Smc c x c x   , 
where *x  is the equilibrium of the homogenous case (recalling Proposition 1).  
The set  *: ( , )Smc x c x   is non-empty because, as can be easily verified, for 1 c   
and any   we have that * ( , )Smx c x  . Furthermore, if ( )mc c   then condition (11) is met 
and, by Proposition 3, we get the equilibrium of type (a); on other hand and if ( )mc c  , then 
the equilibrium of type (b) prevails.  
To show that ( )c   is weakly decreasing in  , we note that 
   * *
A
( ) inf : ( , inf : ˆ) ( ) sup )( ,  m
S id
m m m mxc c x c x c u u x      x , 
where  *1A ( , , ) : ,  for n m i mx x x x x x x i m      . 
We treat the utility function of a mutant migrant who is subjected to a sanction, 
ˆ )( ,mm mu x x , as a function of  , and we adopt the notation ,ˆ )( ,m mmu x x . From (10) we see 
that for *
mx x  the function ,ˆ )( ,m mmu x x  is decreasing in  , which entails that 
1 2, ,
A A
ˆ ˆ)sup ( , sup )( ,m m mm mmu x u x  x x  for 1 2  , while 
*( ,ˆ )m mu x x  is constant in  . Hence,  
    1 2* *, ,
A A
: ) sup ( ,   : ) sup ( ,  ˆ ˆ( ) ( )id im m m m m m
d
m mc u u xxx ux c u    x x , 
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implying that 
2 1( ) ( )c c  . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Recalling the assumption regarding the probability distribution of 
mc , the probability that mc  
will be smaller than or equal to )(c   is  ( )G c  . To prove part (i) of the proposition, we 
assume that ( )c c  . Thus,   0)(G c   : the probability that the assimilation advantage of 
the mutant migrant, 
mc , will be smaller than or equal to )(c   is zero. Put differently, 
expressing the probability that the community will succeed in blocking the mutant migrant 
from acting on his improved ability as  ( 1) )(P G c   , we get that for ( )c c  , 
)( 1P   . This concludes the proof of part (i) of the proposition. 
To prove part (ii) of the proposition, we note that under the assumption that 
0( )c c  , 
we get that   0)(G c   , and that  ( () 0)1P G c    .  
To prove part (iii) of the proposition, we recall from Proposition 2 that ( )c   is weakly 
declining in  , which implies that for 1 2   we get that 1 2( ) ( )c c  . In turn, from the 
monotonicity property of the cumulative distribution function ( )G c  we get that 
   1 2)( ()G Gc c  , which is equivalent to 1 2( () )P P  . Q.E.D. 
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